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A Royal Engineer in the Low Countries

A Cavalry Surgeon at Waterloo

With the Third Guards during the Peninsular War

The First and Last Campaigns of the Great War

Supernatural and Weird Fiction of Vincent O'Sullivan

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Warfare in the Age of Gaius Julius Caesar—Volume 2

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Warfare in the Age of Gaius Julius Caesar—Volume 2
Leonaur Original
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Author(s): Theodore Dodge
Date Published: 2013/07
Page Count: 344
Softcover ISBN-13: 978-1-78282-159-5
Hardcover ISBN-13: 978-1-78282-158-8

A two volume masterpiece on ancient warfare

Little needs to be said here about the fascinating era of the Roman Empire of the first century B. C., or about one of the most outstanding military commanders in history, Gaius Julius Caesar. The military history of the period has always had its avid students and enthusiasts. It also has its notable historians and foremost among these was former soldier, Theodore Ayrault Dodge who was probably the first military historian to walk upon the ground on which all of the events about which he wrote in this classic work took place. Dodge’s grasp of topography and its bearing on tactical issues makes this work indispensible. The Leonaur editors highly regard Dodge’s works on the great captains of warfare through the ages and our edition of ‘Warfare in the Age of Napoleon’ is already available. ‘Warfare in the Age of Gaius Julius Caesar’ is our second offering in the series and it follows the model already established by its predecessor. Based on Dodge’s academically ground-breaking work, ‘Caesar,’ this unique two volume edition, like all of the author’s ‘great captains’ series, benefits from numerous diagrams and maps that explain the campaigns, battles, marches, weapons, equipment, etc., in significant detail. The Leonaur editions have been substantially represented so that all the images—often small in the original editions—have been enlarged to the fullest degree to aid understanding. Volume two covers a five year period in considerable detail and concludes in 45 B. C., a year before Caesar’s death. Chapters on Caesar the man and soldier and the art of war in the Roman Empire are also included. Highly Recommended.
Leonaur editions are newly typeset and are not facsimiles; each title is available in softcover and hardback with dustjacket.

The signal being repeated in the usual manner down the line, the cohorts rushed forward, and could not be restrained. Seeing this and taking advantage of his troops’ enthusiasm, Caesar gave “Good fortune” (Felicitas) as the battle-cry, “spurred on his horse” and joined the fray. The archers and slingers and the cohorts on the right flank, set for this particular duty and now well-trained to encounter elephants, speedily overwhelmed these brutes with a shower of darts and stones, and drove them trumpeting back upon their own lines, where they trampled numberless men under foot, made their way to camp, closed up the entrances, and utterly demoralized the Mauretanian horse in the left wing, which fled incontinent. The lines of foot now clashed. That the Pompeian legions despite their surprise fought well is demonstrated by the fact that they held their own some hours. It was sunset before Caesar’s legions could call the day their own. But after a gallant struggle, Scipio’s right wing partook the growing demoralization; then followed the centre. In a short time thereafter the entire line was melting away towards the half-completed camp. The legionaries of Caesar’s right and left wings soon wheeled around the enemy’s flank and captured the entrenchments which there was scarcely an attempt to defend. The principal officers, fearful of their own fate if captured by Caesar, and appalled at this sign of disaster, without an effort to rally their men, themselves fled from the field. Perceiving this desertion by their chiefs, the whole army, seized with utmost panic, dissolved into formless squads and made its way from the field as best it might. The struggle at the new camp was a short one. The soldiers of Scipio were cut down en masse; all who could still flee started towards the old camp north of the lake.<br>
The garrison of Thapsus had, meanwhile, made a sally along the shore, wading through the surf to aid their friends; but were beaten back by the camp-followers and non-combatants in the siege lines, which Caesar had left to attack Scipio.<br>
Caesar’s legionaries followed hard in pursuit. Scipio, Labienus, Afranius, and other generals had already got away; no sign of defence was made; their army was a mass of fugitives. The men endeavoured to rally at the old camp, where they could still have shown a stout resistance, but there was no one to head them. Seeing none of their officers at this spot, they imagined that they had gone to Juba’s camp nearby (J), and made their way thither to seek them. Finding this camp already in the hands of Caesar’s men, who had flanked them on their left, they at once fled to an adjoining hill, intending to defend themselves. On the approach of their pursuers they became panic-stricken, “cast down their arms, and saluted them in a military manner,” i. e., made the usual signal of surrender.<br>
But surrender availed naught. Caesar’s soldiers were too much wrought up to heed the signal. The Roman people were by nature cruel; in common with all men of their trade in ancient days, Caesar’s legionaries partook the national spirit and had long reproached him for clemency; they had been at war three long years; they now proposed to put an end to the matter, and broke quite beyond control. Caesar, though anxious to spare Roman blood, was unable to stem the tide. The legionaries, glutted with passion and blood, not only slaughtered the armed men, pursuing them in every direction and cutting them down wholesale, but in their frenzy they killed a number of Roman citizens in their own camp, against whom the cry was raised that they were the authors of the war, or secret adherents of Pompey’s cause.
“This made several Roman knights and senators retire from the battle, lest the soldiers, who after so signal a victory assumed an unbounded license, should be induced by the hopes of impunity to wreak their fury on them likewise. In short, all Scipio’s soldiers, though they implored the protection of Caesar, were, in the very sight of that general, and in spite of his entreaties to his men to spare them, without exception put to the sword.”<br>
This escape from control by his legionaries is the most serious criticism on their discipline which can exist. One can scarcely associate such laxity with cohorts which had been even weeks under Caesar. Plutarch says that several authors have claimed that Caesar was not in this battle at all, but was down with an attack of epilepsy. This scarcely accords with the facts elsewhere set down, or with the probabilities; but if anything lends countenance to it, it is the remarkable lack of hold upon his men shown by Caesar on this field, both at the inception and close of the engagement. Their conduct at Pharsalus stands out in marked contrast to it.<br>
At least ten thousand men were slain and sixty-four elephants were taken. Scipio’s whole force was annihilated. Caesar’s army, it is claimed in the Commentaries, lost not over fifty killed and some wounded. Fancy a decisive battle in the nineteenth century won by an army of forty odd thousand men at such a paltry cost!<br>
The flight of the leaders, Scipio, Juba, Labienus, Afranius, Petreius and the others, availed them little. Most of them were unable to escape pursuing fate, whether by land or sea, and either fell that day or within a few weeks. Labienus made his way to Spain. Scipio reached his shipping, but was overtaken by bad weather, driven into Hippo, attacked by Sitius, and fell in the ensuing action. Some lesser chiefs reached Utica.<br>
As Thapsus did not surrender after this signal victory, though formally summoned to do so, with a display of the captured elephants, Caesar left the proconsul C. Rebellius with three legions to continue the siege, sent Cnaeus Domitius to invest Considius in Tysdra with two, and having been lavish in praises and rewards to his troops,—the Fifth legion was allowed to adopt an elephant as ensign,—he set out for Ucita and Hadrumetum, which he took February 10 and 11, and where he found Scipio’s stores and much military treasure. Thence he marched on Utica, with Messala commanding the cavalry in the van. He was anxious to capture Cato and a number of Scipio’s lieutenants who had fled for refuge to its walls.<br>
Scipio’s cavalry escaped in a body from the battle as the foot could not, and started for Utica. On the way they were refused entrance to the town of Parada, but forced the place. In revenge for the refusal, they built a huge fire in the forum and into it cast the whole population bound hand and foot, with everything which they could not carry away as plunder. After this signal act of barbarity they marched to Utica, where they in like manner began to plunder and slaughter, and were only stopped by being bought off with money by Cato and Sylla Faustus. Cato endeavoured to arouse the inhabitants to resist Caesar, but, unable to accomplish more than to gain permission from the city for all adherents of Pompey to leave for Spain, on February 12 he committed suicide. <br>