PAYMENT OPTIONS

Forthcoming titles

(Book titles are subject to change)

A Royal Engineer in the Low Countries

A Cavalry Surgeon at Waterloo

With the Third Guards during the Peninsular War

The First and Last Campaigns of the Great War

Supernatural and Weird Fiction of Vincent O'Sullivan

Supernatural and Weird Fiction of Algernon Blackwood

Narratives of the Anglo-Zulu War

and many others

The War in the Peninsula, 1808-1814

enlarge Click on image to enlarge
enlarge Mouse over the image to zoom in
The War in the Peninsula, 1808-1814
Qty:     - OR -   Add to Wish List

Author(s): Alexander Innes Shand
Date Published: 2011/06
Page Count: 264
Softcover ISBN-13: 978-0-85706-606-0
Hardcover ISBN-13: 978-0-85706-605-3

Napoleon’s war for Spain and Portugal

The author of this book, Alexander Innes Shand, was a prolific writer of his day producing popular histories, biographies of renowned soldiers, novels and as a notable field sportsman numerous works on hunting, shooting and fishing. He was also a newspaper correspondent and covered the Franco-Prussian War for The Times followed by a book about his experiences during the conflict. His particular interest in the Peninsular War resulted in two books, the one you are now holding and the other about the careers of Wellington’s Lieutenants (also published by Leonaur). As one might expect from a professional writer Shand guides his readers through the Peninsular War in a comprehensive but easy to read style. His narrative covers more of the operations of the Spanish Army in the field than British historians usually do, but in the main he offers an even handed overview of all of the participants. When first published this book contained few maps, Leonaur has added to these especially as regards battle plans and therefore should not be confused with other editions. For those interested in the war in the Iberian peninsula Shand’s book is a good and accessible history that is useful for those new to the subject and for another perspective.
Leonaur editions are newly typeset and are not facsimiles; each title is available in softcover and hardback with dustjacket.

The French rushed in through blinding clouds of dust, and in the old Gothic church and through the side chapels a desperate hand-to-hand combat ensued, when soldiers and peasants were mingled with monks and women. The grenadiers followed the defenders up the stairs to renew the fighting on the roofs, where quarter was neither given nor asked, and the grotesque gargoyles were belching out the blood that flowed from the gutters in the lead.<br>
The French pillaged anything that fire or powder had spared, not so much for the sake of plunder as for protection from bullets and the weather. The folios from the monkish libraries were easily built up as breastworks; the varnished canvases from altars and chapels made excellent protection against the rain, and the parchment leaves torn from precious manuscripts were spread between the sleepers and the damp ground. Repeatedly the despondent soldiers were on the point of mutiny, and had any of their generals but Lannes or Soult been in command, it is doubtful whether the siege would not have been raised. But Lannes sustained the spirit of his men by keeping them actively employed, and by representing the desperate case of the besieged. Nor would it have been easy to exaggerate that. Only the stronger of the famished garrison were fit for duty; famine had brought epidemics in its train; malignant typhus was raging, and the mortality was greatest among the women and children, who had been confined for weeks in pestilential cellarage.<br>
The corpses filled the cellars and choked the streets; fortunately the colder weather preserved them, so that they could be made useful for barricades, when the defenders were too feeble to tear up the heavy paving stones. Surrender had become a matter of necessity, and it had become possible through the death of the democratic chiefs. Yet there were still stubborn enthusiasts who refused to yield, and the negotiations had to be conducted with craft and secrecy. Fair terms were granted, considering the desperate circumstances. And even the French, who were naturally resentful of that ruthless strife, were moved by pity when they saw some 12,000 sickly and starving tatterdemalions, survivors of a force of four times that number, limp painfully out of the city to lay down their arms.<br>
The embarkation of Moore’s army had complicated the situation in Portugal, the base of the British operations in the Peninsula, and the surrender of Zaragoza discouraged Spain, as it set free 25,000 French soldiers. Sir John Cradock was in command at Lisbon. His position had always been difficult; the forces at his disposal were numerically weak; he was subordinated to the authority of the civilian envoys; for months he had no communication with the War Office; his instructions were not only indefinite but conflicting, and he was drifting in circumstances which could not have been foreseen. The justice he deserved has scarcely been done him. Wellington was a soldier of genius, Moore was a soldier of talent, Cradock was a soldier of capacity and resource. Had affairs then been directed by a timid man or a blunderer, undoubtedly Portugal must have been evacuated.<br>
Cradock had barely 10,000 men with which to garrison the frontier fortresses and to secure Lisbon, which was the point of supreme importance. Even when he received reinforcements he could never put half that number in the field, and the long frontier he was supposed to defend was easily assailable by an enterprising enemy. He had efficient irregular leaders in Wilson and Trant, but their undrilled Portuguese levies were in no way reliable. There was sedition, with something like anarchy, in Oporto, nor was the condition of Lisbon much more reassuring. The central Government there was at open enmity with the turbulent Bishop of Oporto and his delegates. Cradock’s instructions were, in case of necessity, not only to embark his troops but to carry off the Portuguese fleet and the contents of the arsenals.<br>
While events were in suspense he made extraordinary efforts, not only to send succours to Moore, but regiments to strengthen the garrison of Cadiz, thus establishing, according to the desires of the Cabinet, a second base of operations in the south of Spain, from which the British might direct the defence of Andalusia. The succour never reached Moore, since he had severed his communications with Portugal; the vanity and jealous imbecility of the Spanish Junta baulked the other scheme, and the negotiations of Frere and the energetic Sir George Smith were fruitless. Moreover, the French interest was always strong in the south, and there were traitors in the Spanish Council. The troops sent out on these missions returned or were recalled when Cradock needed every man at his disposal. For as reverse followed reverse, invasion became certain in the north of Portugal, and imminent in the west. It was known that Soult meant to pass the Minho. Victor, with the first corps, was in Estremadura, threatening Badajoz, which was even less prepared to stand a siege than the Portuguese frontier fortress of Elvas. The division of Lapisse was to operate between, menacing Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.<br>
The utmost Cradock could do was to concentrate troops and efforts for the defence of the capital, with the always probable alternative of evacuation. The preparations in case of the worst were perhaps unnecessarily ostentatious. The Portuguese, not unnaturally, were alarmed and excited at the prospect of being abandoned. The Englishmen were insulted, and an outbreak was not improbable. Cradock took his precautions carefully. The forts of Lisbon were strongly garrisoned, and, adopting the schemes of Junot’s staff officers in somewhat similar circumstances, he secured the commanding heights of Saccavem without the city. In fact, in some degree, he anticipated Wellington’s idea by entrenching himself in a Torres Vedras on a smaller scale.
You may also like